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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
EDITED BY DAVID

P. STEWART

United Nations Convention on the Law o/the Sea-territorial dispute-maritime boundary delimitationmethodologies-exclusive economic zone-continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME DISPUTE (Nicaragua v. Colombia). At http://www.icj-cij.org.

International Court ofJustice, November 19,2012.

On November 19, 2012, the International Court ofJustice rendered its judgment in a dispute involving territorial and maritime claims raised by Nicaragua against Colombia in the
Caribbean Sea.! The Court considered Nicaragua's requests for a declaration of Nicaraguan
sovereignty over seven disputed maritime features and delimitation of a single maritime
boundary between the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones appertaining to Nicaragua and Colombia. The Court awarded all disputed territory to Colombia and delimited the
maritime boundary between the states' continental shelves and exclusive economic zones by
using a novel mix of weighted base points, geodetic lines, parallels of latitude, and enclaving.
Nicaragua lies in the southwestern portion of the Caribbean Sea, bordering Honduras to the
north and Costa Rica to the south, while Colombia's mainland is located in the south of the
Caribbean Sea (see map, Southwestern Caribbean Sea, p. 397). San Andres, Providencia, and
Santa Catalina Islands are situated about 100 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast and
about 380 nautical miles from Colombia's mainland coast. Various reefs, cays, atolls, and
banks lie in the western Caribbean, within 200 nautical miles of Nicaragua' s coast, but beyond
200 nautical miles of Colombia's mainland coast.
Nicaragua filed its application with the Court on December 6,2001. In addition to the disputed claims examined by the Court in the judgment on the merits, Nicaragua claimed sovereignty over San Andres, Santa Catalina, and Providencia. It sought to base jurisdiction on
the Pact of Bogota, 2 as well as the parties' declarations under Article 36 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court ofInternational Justice. 3 Colombia raised preliminary objections to jurisdiction on July 21,2003. In a judgment of December 13, 2007, the Court concurred with
Colombia that a 1928 treaty and 1930 protocol between the parties had "settled" any dispute
over San Andres, Providencia, and Catalina within the meaning of Article XXXI of the Pact
ofBogota. 4 Consequently, the issue of title to these three islands lay outside its jurisdiction. The
1 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.) (Int'l Ct. Justice Nov. 19,2012) [hereinafter Judgment).
Decisions of the Court cited herein are available at its website, http://www.icj-cij.org.
2 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, OASTS Nos. 17 & 61, 30 UNTS 55 [hereinafter Pact
of Bogota).
3 Statute of the International Court ofJustice Art. 36(5); Statute of the Permanent Court ofInternationai Justice
Art. 36.
4 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Preliminary Objections, 2007 IC] REp. 832 (Dec. 13).
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Editor's note: Derived from the judgment of the International Court ofJ ustice of November 19, 2012, in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Sketch-map No.1, at 16.

Court upheld its jurisdiction concerning title to the seven remaining maritime features and the
maritime delimitation, and in separate judgments rendered on May 4, 2011, rejected requests
to intervene on the merits by Honduras and Costa Rica. 5
The Court began its judgment of November 19,2012, by addressing sovereignty over the
maritime features (para. 25). The parties agreed that six of the seven features were islands,
remaining above water at high tide, and were therefore capable of appropriation consistent
with the Court's practice. They presented conflicting evidence, however, regarding the status
ofQuitasuefio. The Court found that only one of its features, QS 32, was an island despite
its small size and coral debris composition, relying on Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain 6 and the absence of any minimum size requirement for
islands (para. 37).
The Court based its award of title over all disputed territory to Colombia on e.ffectivites after
deeming historical evidence regarding interpretation of the 1928 treaty and 1930 protocol
concerning the geographic scope of the "San Andres Archipelago" inconclusive (paras. 66,
5 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene
(Int'l Ct. Justice May 4,2011); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Application by Honduras for
Permission to Intervene (Int'l Ct. Justice May 4,2011).
6 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatarv. Bahr.), 2001 IC] REp.
40,99, para. 195 (Mar. 16) [hereinafter Qatar v. Bahrain].
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103). Further, neither Colombia nor Nicaragua had established title to the disputed features
by virtue of uti possidetis juris at the time of independence from Spain. After tracing the critical
date to a 1969 exchange of notes between the parties (para. 71), the Court determined that
Colombia had acted atitre de souverain concerning all of the disputed features through public
administration and legislation, regulation of economic activities, public works, law enforcement measures, naval visits and rescue operations, and recognition of consular representation
(paras. 82- 84). The Court found additional support for Colombia's claims in Nicaragua's failure to protest a 1900 arbitral award involving Colombia and Costa Rica (para. 88),7 maps, and
third-state practice, including the 1972 Vazquez-Saccio Treaty between Colombia and the
United States, in which the United States renounced sovereignty over two of the disputed cays
(para. 95).8 Nicaragua provided no evidence of having acted atitre de souverain over the disputed maritime features.
In its reply and final submissions, Nicaragua for the first time claimed an extended continental shelf generated by the natural prolongation of its landmass beyond 200 nautical miles
from its baselines, creating an area of overlapping entitlements with Colombia's continental
shelf. While acknowledging Nicaragua's claim as new, the Court held it admissible because it
did not transform the subject matter of the dispute. 9 Rather, it changed the legal basis for the
delimitation claim from distance to natural prolongation and modified the solution sought
from a single maritime boundaty to a continental shelf delimitation. But the Court refrained
from adjudicating the extended continental shelf claim, finding that Nicaragua had not established that its continental margin extended far enough to overlap with Colombia's 200-nautical-mile continental shelf entitlement (para. 129). Moreover, Nicaragua had not provided
any examples of courts tasked with determining the outer limits of an extended continental
shelf (para. 125). The Court distinguished the recent decision of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea in Delimitation o/the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay ofBengal because of the unique circumstances of the Bay of Bengal (id ).10 Further, the Court stated that parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) II must submit extended continental shelf claims to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf (Commission), in accordance with Article 76, and Colombia's nonparty status did not relieve Nicaragua of this obligation (para. 126). Finally, the Court noted
Nicaragua's admission that the "Preliminary Information" it had submitted to the Commission did not meet Article 76's requirements (para. 127).
Both the Court and the parties concurred that the law applicable to the delimitation
included UNCLOS Articles 74 (exclusive economic zone), 83 (continental shelf delimitation),
and 121 (legal regime of islands ) (para. 138). The Court had previously recognized the first two
Boundary Dispute (Colom.lCosta Rica), 28 R.I.A.A. 341, 345 (1900) (in French).
Treaty Concerning the Status of Quita Suefio, Roncador, and Serrana [Vazquez-Saccio Treaty]' U.S.-Colom.,
Art. 1, Sept. 8, 1972,33 UST 1405,1307 UNTS 379 (entered into force Sept. 17, 1981).
9 The Court relied on its previous judgments in Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Hondurasin the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007ICJ REp. 661, 695 (Oct. 8) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. Honduras];
andAhmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2010 ICJ REp. 639, 657, para. 41 (Nov. 30).
10 Delimiration of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bang!' v. Myan.), Case No. 16 (ITLOS Mar.
14,2012), at http://www.idos.org (reported by D. H. Anderson at 106 AJIL 817 (2012».
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedforsignature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, available
at http://www.un.org/deptsllos/ [hereinafter UNCLOS].
7
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paragraphs of Article 121 as customary international law. 12 In this judgment, the Court added
paragraph 3, which denies an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to rocks "which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life," 13 leaving them only a territorial sea (para.
139). Also, it emphasized the "indivisible" nature of the legal regime of islands established in
Article 121 (id).
The Court determined that Nicaragua's relevant coast was the mainland coast projecting
into the area of overlapping entitlements, and it measured the 200-nautical-mile continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone from the islands fringing the Nicaraguan coast (para. 145).
Colombia's relevant coasts were limited to the islands over which Colombia has sovereignty
since no overlapping entitlement exists between the mainland coasts of Colombia and Nicaragua projected out to a distance of200 nautical miles (para. 151). The entire coastlines of the
Colombian islands were deemed relevant because the area of overlapping entitlements extends
to the east of the islands. In defining the relevant area, the Court took pains to avoid the numerous
other maritime boundaries in the Caribbean Sea and emphasized that its decision in this case would
not prejudice the position of any third states. In measuring the relevant coastal length, the Court
excluded the Nicaraguan islands' east-facing coasts as being parallel to the mainland, and some
Colombian maritime features as being too small to affect Colombia's coastal length. The final
ratio between the relevant coasts was 1:8.2 in favor of Nicaragua (para. 153).
The Court agreed with the parties that San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina are entitled to a territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone. It rejected Nicaragua's
argument for a 3-nautical-mile territorial sea for four additional maritime features, Roncador,
Serrana, the Alburquerque Cays, and the East-Southeast Cays, emphasizing that it has never
restricted a state's right to establish a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea because of overlap with
another state's continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (paras. 178 - 80). The Court
declined to determine whether any of these features fall within UNCLOS Article 121 (3), and
are therefore not entitled to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, because any such
entitlement within the relevant area would overlap entirely with the entitlements of San
Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina to a continental shelf and exclusive economic zone
(para. 180). In addition, Colombia could use low-tide elevations within 12 nautical miles of
QS 32 for the purpose of measuring the breadth ofQuitasueno's territorial sea, in accordance
with Article 13, which the Court had deemed part of customary international law in Qatar v.
Bahrain (paras. 182-83).
The Court reiterated its commitment to its long-established three-step methodology for
maritime delimitation: (1) construction of a provisional equidistancel median line, (2) consideration of relevant circumstances requiring adjustment or shifting of the line, and (3) determination of whether the parties' "respective shares of the relevant area are markedly disproportionate to their respective relevant coasts" (para. 193). It rejected Nicaragua's arguments
for a different methodology because of the unique geographical circumstances in this case, but
it noted that the methodology could be used in conjunction with the enclaving of islands
(paras. 197-99).
To consttuct the provisional equidistance line, the Court selected base points for Nicaragua
because Nicaragua had not indicated any base points in its presentation (para. 200). Some, but
12
13

Qatar v. Bahrain, 2001 IC] REp. at 91, para. 167; 97, para. 185; 99, para. 195.
UNCLOS, supra note 11, Art. 121(3).
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not all of the base points suggested by Colombia were used. For example, the Court disregarded
a base point placed on QS 32, stating that it was minuscule and would unduly distort the relevant geography (para. 202).
According to the Court, two relevant circumstances merited shifting the provisional equidistance line, namely, the significant disparity in length between the relevant coasts and the
cutting off of maritime areas into which Nicaragua's coastline projects by small island territories located far apart from each other (paras. 211, 215). The Court rejected arguments that
Colombia's conduct east of the 82nd meridian, security and law enforcement considerations,
and equitable access to natural resources constitured relevant circumstances (paras. 220, 222).
Nonetheless, it noted that security concerns may be relevant if a maritime delimitation is
effected particularly close to a state's coast and that it would "bear this consideration in
mind" in deciding what adjustments to make to the provisional median line or how to
shift it (para. 222). Colombia's agreements with third states were deemed irrelevant because
they cannot afford Colombia rights in a dispute with Nicaragua, an independent third
party (para. 227). Similarly, the Court emphasized that its decision in this dispute is withour prejudice to third states' claims or claims by one of the parties against a third state
(para. 228).
The Court found that the disparity in coastal lengths merited a meaningful shift of the equidistance line eastward (para. 233). The methodology of weighted base points adopted by the
Court afforded Nicaraguan base points three times as much weight as those of Colombia in
constructing the line. Consequently, each point on the line is three times as far away from the
Nicaraguan base points as from the Colombian base points (para. 234). The Court simplified
the weighted line by connecting several turning points with geodetic lines {para. 235). It chose
not to extend the line north of the northernmost point or south of the southernmost point to
avoid giving Colombia a larger share of the relevant area in view of the much greater length of
Nicaragua's relevant coast (para. 236). Instead, the Court continued the boundary line along
parallels oflatitude to 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines to give proper weight to
the relevant circumstances previously identified (id).
From the northernmost point of the 12-naurical-mile area around Roncador, the delimitation line follows a parallel oflatitude out to 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines
(para. 237) (see the Court's Sketch-map No. 11, p. 401). Since Nicaragua has not yet established baselines from which its territorial sea is measured, the Court noted that the location of
the end point is approximate (id.). From the southernmost point of the adjusted line, the
delimitation line travels southeast until it reaches the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs of the
South Cay ofAlburquerque Cays. A parallel connects this area to the 12-nautical-mile envelope
of arcs of the East-Southeast Cays at the latter's southernmost point. The delimitation line follows the envelope of arcs until the East-Southeast Cays' easternmost point and then runs out
to 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's baselines along a parallel oflatitude.
The Court turned, next, to Quitasuefio and Serrana, Colombian features on the Nicaraguan
side of the delimitation line. It chose not to extend the boundary line to these islands because
of their size, remoteness, and distance from the larger Colombian islands, finding that the "use
ofenclaves" would yield the "most equitable solution" (para. 238). After determining that Quitasuefio was a rock within the meaning of Article 121 (3), the Court ruled that it was entitled
only to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea (id.). By virtue of its small size and remoteness, Serrana
was granted only a 12-mile territorial sea (id).
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The Court checked the resulting delimitation line for significant disproportionality, which
could render it impermissibly inequitable (para. 239). Although the delimitation generated a
ratio of 1:3.44 in Nicaragua's favor, while the ratio of relevant coasts was 1:8.2 in Nicaragua's
favor (para. 243), the Court considered the delimitation equitable in light of previous judgments. 14 Given the area attributed to Colombia by the new delimitation line, the Court
rejected Nicaragua's request for a declaration concerning its rights to natural resources east of
the 82nd meridian (para. 250).
Although Judge Owada dissented as to the admissibility of Nicaragua's continental shelf
claim, the remainder of the judgment was unanimous on all points. On November 27,2012,
eight days after the Court issued its judgment, Colombia denounced the Pact of Bogota. 15

****
The judgment is noteworthy for its application of innovative and numerous techniques for
maritime boundary delimitation, interpretation of states' obligations pursuant to UNCLOS
Article 76(8) concerning extended continental shelf claims, and potential to influence other
delimitations in the area. The Court constructed an equiratio line using weighted base points, 16
utilized geodetic lines to simplify the equiratio line, and employed parallels oflatitude from the
end points of the boundary to 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua's base points and enclaving.
When faced with similarly challenging geographic circumstances, the Court has adopted varied methods and techniques such as applying angle bisectors, granting half effect to islands, and
shifting equidistance lines,17 but this appears to be its first use of equiratio lines. A maritime
boundary line is an equiratio line "when every point of it will be defined by a constant ratio of
its distances from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each state is measured."18 By weighting the base points 1:3 in Nicaragua's favor, each
point on the maritime boundary line is three times as far from Nicaraguan base points as from
Colombian ones. The use of novel and varied approaches by a unanimous court may signal
renewed flexibility for achieving equity in complex maritime boundary delimitations. Nonetheless, the Court's creativity resulted in a somewhat complicated line between Nicaragua and
Colombia l9 and may be unsettling to states comfortable with more conventional approaches.
The judgment is remarkable, too, for its discussion of states' obligations under UNCLOS
Article 76(8), concerning extended continental shelf claims. The Court ultimately refrained
from delimiting Nicaragua's extended continental shelf claim on burden-of-proof grounds;
14 See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 IC] REp.
38 (June 14).
15 OAS Dep't of International Law, Pact of Bogota: Signatories and Ratifications, at http://www.oas.orgl
juridico/english/sigs/a-42.html.
16 Shortly after UNCLOS was concluded, Wijnand Langeraar proposed equiratio lines as an alternative when
equidistance lines engender inequitable results. Wijnand Langeraar, Maritime Delimitation: The Equiratio Metho~A New Approach, 10 MARINE POL'y 3 (1986), available at hnp:llwww.csc.noaa.gov/mbwgl_pdf/biblio/
Langeraar.pdf.
17 See, e.g., Nicaragua v. Honduras, 2007 IC] REp. at695 (angle bisectors); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can.lU.S.), 1984 IC] REP. 246 (Oct. 12) (half effect to islands); Continental Shelf
(Libya/Malta), 1985 IC] REp. 13 (June 3) (shifting equidisrance lines).
18 Langeraar, supra note 16, at 7.
19 Decl. Cot, J. ad hoc, para. 14.
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Nicaragua had failed to establish the existence of overlapping continental shelves generated by
Colombia and its own mainland coasts. Yet the Court stressed that Nicaragua had also failed
to comply with its obligation to submit adequate information to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf pursuant to UNCLOS Article 76(8) and that Colombia's nonparty
status did not alter Nicaragua's obligation. Several judges expressed concerns about the Court's
reasoning and its implications in separate opinions.20 First, treaty provisions generally do not
give rise to rights and obligations between a state party and a nons tate party.21 The Court did
not engage in any analysis to demonstrate that this procedural requirement reflects a customaty
international law obligation, relying instead on the object and purpose of UNCLOS derived
from its preamble (para. 126).22 Second, the discussion of Article 76(8) raises questions about
whether submission of extended continental shelf claims to the Commission is a prerequisite
to delimitation by a court. 23 Several of the Court's judges, in separate opinions, sought to dispel
this notion. 24 For example, Judge Donoghue emphasized that it may be appropriate to delimit
a continental shelf area beyond 200 nautical miles from a state's coast before the outer limits
of an extended continental shelf are identified, as in the recent Bay ofBengal case. 25
The judgment's potential impact on third states in the Caribbean Sea region remains to be
seen. While the Court repeatedly emphasized that the judgment would not prejudice third
states with maritime boundary claims in the area, four judges disagreed,26 asserting that it could
affect interpretation of the Court's judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea2 7 and bilateral agreements between states in the
Caribbean Sea. 28 Time will tell whether new claims or requests for interpretation of previous
judgments arise as a result of this case.
Colombia's denunciation of the Pact of Bogora., named after its capital city, raises concerns
for future pacific resolution of disputes in the region. Despite the unanimous judgment,
Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos declared, "Never again should we have to face what
happened to us on November 19th."29 Colombia is the second state to withdraw from the pact
since its entry into force in 1948. 30
NIENKE GROSSMAN

University ofBaltimore School ofLaw

See sep. op. Donoghue, ]., paras. 26-30; decl. Cot,]. ad hoc, para. 19. See generally decl. Mensah,]. ad hoc.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts. 34-38, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS
331,8 ILM 679 (1969).
22 Decl. Cot,]. ad hoc, para. 18; see also decl. Mensah,]. ad hoc, paras. 2-3.
23 Decl. Mensah,]. ad hoc, para. 12; sep. op. Donoghue, ]., para. 2.
24 Decl. Mensah, ]. ad hoc, para. 12; sep. op. Donoghue, ]., paras. 2, 19.
25 Sep. op. Donoghue,]., para. 19.
26 Id, para. 30; decl. Cot,]. ad hoc, para. 9; decl. Mensah,]. ad hoc, para. 13; decl. Xue, ]., paras. 11-13.
27 Sep. op. Donoghue, ]., para. 35.
28 Decl. Cor,]. ad hoc, paras. 4-7, 9.
29 An Islet for a Sea, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2012, available at http://www.economist.comlnews/americas/
21567986-colombia-smarrs-loss-territorial-waters-islet-sea.
30 EI Salvador notified denunciarion of the treaty on November 24, 1973. OAS Dep't ofInternational Law, supra
note 15.
20
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Convention on the Law ofthe Sea-warship immunity-scope ofapplicability ofConvention-provisional
measures-definition of warship-arbitral jurisdiction

THE "ARA LIBERTAD" (Argentina v. Ghana). ITLOS Case No. 20. Provisional Measures. At http://
www.itlos.org.
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, December 15,2012.
On December 15, 2012, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal or
ITLOS) ordered Ghana to resupply and, upon payment of security, to refuel and release the
Argentine naval frigateARA Libertad, which was being held by authorities in the Ghanaian port
ofTema. 1 The Tribunal ordered release of the vessel in response to Argentina's request for provisional measures under Article 290(5) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (Convention or UNCLOS).2 The Tribunal accepted Argentina's prima facie showing that
the Libertad, a tall, three-masted sailing ship commissioned in the Argentine Navy being used
as a training vessel for officer cadets, qualifies as a "warship" under Article 29 ofUNCLOS, and
was therefore entitled to immunity and release to avoid irreparable harm to Argentina pending
the final outcome of the case (paras. 93-95).
The voyage of the Libertad to the west coast ofMrica had been planned at a meeting between
Argentina and the countries of sub-Saharan Mrica in Buenos Aires in April 20 11. Diplomats
from Ghana were present at the meeting and agreed that the ship would visit that country as
part ofa thirteen-nation goodwill cruise and official engagement visit to West Mrica. The vessel
was on its forty-third training mission when it arrived in T ema, near Accra, on October 1,
2012. It carried a crew of220, including 69 members of the Argentine Navy and 110 naval
officer cadets.
The day after the Libertad arrived in port, a U.S. judgment creditor, NML Capital, filed a
Statement of Claim before the High Court of Ghana (Commercial Division) of the Superior
Courts of Judicature 3 seeking an order of in rem attachment of the Libertad to satisfy a judgment against Argentina that had earlier been granted in the United States. The judgment was
awarded in favor ofNML Capital by the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York in a case involving Argentina's default in payment obligations under sovereign
bonds. 4
NML Capital held $370 million worth of distressed debt obligations arising from $95 billion in bonds issued by the Argentine government in 2001. Argentina's subsequent default on
those bonds led to dozens of complex litigation cases in federal court by the Cayman Islandsbased fund NML Capital, which is owned by the investment firm Elliott Management Corp.
and other creditors. The bonds in question contained an explicit waiver ofsovereign immunity
from suit by Argentina:
1 "ARA Libertad" (Arg. v. Ghana), Case. No. 20, Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, para. 108
(ITLOS Dec. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Libertad]. The order and other documents of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea cited herein are available online at its website, http://www.iclos.org.
2 Vnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, available at http://www.un.orgldeptsllosl [hereinafter UNCLOS].
3 The Superior Courts of Judicature of Ghana are composed of the Supreme Court, the Coun of Appeal, and
the High Coun.
4 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic ofArg., 2009 V.S. Dist. LEXIS 19046 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009), aff'd, 699 F.3d
246 (2d Cir. 2012).
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The [Argentine] republic has hereby irrevocably agreed not to claim and has irrevocably
waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction ...
provided further that such agreement and waiver, in so far as it relates to any jurisdiction
... is given solely for the purpose of enabling the fiscal agent or a holder of securities of
this series to enforce or execute a related judgment. 5
On the basis of that waiver, the High Court granted NML Capital's request for an order attaching the vessel.
The order ignited a two-month standoff between port authorities and the Argentine
government. The ship had originally been scheduled to leave Tema on October 4,2012. At
8:00 p.m. on October 2, however, an official of the Judicial Service of the Superior Courts of
] udicature, on behalf of the High Court, arrived at the Libertad to deliver the court's order that
the ship be held in port. In the ensuing days, Susana Pataro, Argentina's ambassador to Ghana,
and Ebenezer Appreku, director of the Legal and Consular Bureau of Ghana' s Ministry of ForeignAffairs and Regional Integration, both advised the High Court that the vessel was immune
from the court's jurisdiction and inviolable as a matter of international law. A high-level diplomatic delegation from Argentina visited Accra from October 16 to 19, to meet with the minister ofdefense, the minister of the interior, and advisers to the president of Ghana to try to find
a solution to the impasse. The interventions failed to resolve the dispute.
On November 5, 2012, High Court judge RichardAdjei-Frimponggranted Tema port officials authority to move the ship from its original position to a new anchorage because of congestion at the pier. Two days later, in an effort to move the ship to a different berth, port officials attempted to board the ship forcibly but were prevented from doing so by armed
Argentine watchstanders. By then, Argentina had removed everyone from the ship except a
skeleton crew of forty-five naval personnel. When the Libertad refused to comply with the
order, port authorities cut off water and electricity to the ship, which forced the vessel to resort
to onboard power. Without fresh water and ample fuel to power the engines, conditions on
the ship deteriorated.
Argentina then sought arbitration under UNCLOS to resolve the crisis. Both Argentina and
Ghana are parties to the Convention. Compulsory jurisdiction under Article 287 is limited to
disputes regarding "the interpretation and application" of the treaty, and the article offers various choices for the proceedings, including ITLOS, the International Court of] ustice, and two
types of arbitral tribunals (arbitration or special arbitration). On November 14, Argentina submitted a request to ITLOS for the prescription of provisional measures in accordance with
UNCLOS Article 290(5)6 pending constitution of the arbitral tribunal it was requesting under
Annex VII to the Convention. Argentina sought the following provisional measure: "that
Ghana unconditionally enables the Argentine warship Frigate ARA Libertad to leave the T ema
port and the jurisdictional waters of Ghana, and be resupplied to that end."?
The gravamen of Argentina's complaint was that Ghana had violated its international obligation to respect the immunity of the ship from jurisdiction and execution, which is enjoyed
Libenad, Written Statement of the Republic of Ghana, app. 3, at 61-62 (Nov. 28, 2012).
Libenad, Republic of Argentina Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, para. 1 (Nov. 14,2012)
[hereinafter Argentina Request].
7 Id., para. 28.
5

6

406

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 107

by warships pursuant to Article 32 ofUNCLOS, Article 3 of the 1926 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels,
and customary international law. 8 Article 32 ofUNCLOS is derived from Article 22 of the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 9
The ITLOS hearing opened on November 29. On the first morning, the government of
Argentina presented the rationale and evidence for its request for provisional measures so that
the Libertad could leave Tema port and Ghana's jurisdictional waters and be resupplied to that
end. lO Argentina claimed that its rights were suffering "irreparable damage," with dire consequences to the sovereignty and dignity of the state. I I Under Article 290(5), provisional measures also require an element of urgency. In the MOX Plant case, for example, ITLOS stated
that Article 290(5) may be applied pending the constitution of an Armex VII arbitral tribunal
if the tribunal considers that "the urgency of the situation so requires in the sense that action
prejudicial to the rights of either party ... is likely to be taken before constitution of the Armex
VII arbitral tribunal."12 The Annex VII tribunal upheld this formula two years later. 13
Ghana submitted that the request for provisional measures should be rejected and that
Argentina be required to pay all costs incurred in connection with the case.
Even though the Tribunal found prima facie jurisdiction, it was not required to prescribe
provisional measures. ITLOS balanced the risk of inaction-injury to state sovereignty and the
national dignity ofArgentina-against the risk borne by Ghana that releasing the vessel would
make enforcement proceedings impossible. As a provisional order, the ITLOS decision postponed judgment on the merits of Argentina's claim and considered only whether the request
for relief constituted a prima facie basis on which the jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal might be founded (para. 60). Under UNCLOS Article 290(1) and (5), such a prima facie
finding of jurisdiction is required to hear cases of provisional measures, and ITLOS applied the
same standard as the one articulated in the International Court of] ustice' s Iceland Fisheries case
for finding a colorable basis for jurisdiction. 14
Argentina argued that the Libertad met the definition of a warship in UNCLOS Article 29 15
and accordingly was immune from the jurisdiction of any state under UNCLOS Article 32.
Article 32 states that "nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships." Ghana
countered that Article 32 applied only to the territorial sea, whereas the ship lay in Ghana's

8 Jd, para. 31. See International Convention for the Unification of Cerrain Rules Concerning the Immuniry
of State-Owned Vessels, Art. 3, Apr. 10, 1926, 176 LNTS 199, reprinted in 26 AJIL Supp. 527, 566 (1932) (in
French); seealro Convention Relating to the Regulation ofAerial Navigation, Art. 32, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 LNTS 173;
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,1944,61 Stat. 1180,15 UNTS 295.
9 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Art. 22, Apr. 29,1958,15 UST 1606,
516 UNTS 205. The relevant provision of the 1958 Convention states that "nothing in these articles affects" the
immunities of government ships operated for noncommercial purposes.
10 Libertad, Public sirring, Doc. ITLOS/PV.12/C20/1, at 1 (Nov. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Public sitting].
II Jd at 25.
12 MaX Plant (Ir. v. UK), Case No. 10, Provisional Measures, para. 64 (IllOS Dec. 3, 2001).
13 MaX Plant (Ir. v. UK), Order No.3, Suspension of Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, paras. 35, 38,
58 (UNCLOS Ann. VII Arb. Trib. June 24, 2003),42 ILM 1187 (2003), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org.
14 Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Ice.), Provisional Measures, 1972 IC] REp. 12, paras. 15,20-21 (Aug. 17).
15 The definition in Article 29 is drawn almost verbatim from Article 8(2) of the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 UST 2312, 450 UNTS 82.
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internal waters. The Tribunal noted, however, that the immunity of warships applies in internal waters as well under general international law. Although "most of the provisions" in Part
II relate to the territorial sea, some provisions, such as the definition of warships i'n Article 29,
"may be applicable to all maritime areas" (para. 64). ITLOS therefore affirmed that a dispute
existed between the parties over the applicability of Article 32 that "affords a basis on which
prima facie jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal might be founded" (para. 66).
Argentina also claimed that Ghana was precluding the Libertad from exercising its right to
enjoy innocent passage in the territorial sea according to Articles 17 and 18(1)(b) ofUNCLOS;
freedom of navigation and related internationally lawful uses of the sea reflected in Articles
56(2) and 58 ofUNCLOS; and the right to exercise high seas freedoms set forth in Articles 87
and 90 of the Convention, by preventing the vessel from getting under way.16 Professor
Gerhard Hafner, co-agent for Argentina, argued that the exercise of navigational rights directly
depends upon the ability to make departure from port. He referred to the International Court
of Justice's declaration on the merits in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua:
[I]n order to enjoy access to ports, foreign vessels possess a customary right of innocent
passage in territorial waters for the purposes of entering or leaving internal waters; article
18, paragraph l(b), of [UNCLOS] does no more than codify customary international law
on this point. Since freedom of navigation is guaranteed, first in the exclusive economic
zones which may exist beyond territorial waters ... , it follows that any State which enjoys
a right of access to ports for its ships also enjoys all the freedom necessaty for maritime
navigation. 17
Ghana countered that the dispute between the two parties was one of general international
law, rather than the interpretation or application of specific provisions ofUNCLOS, and was
therefore not justiciable under the Convention. Argentina suggested that the relationship
between general international law and UNCLOS involved much more cross-pollination. Article 300 of the Convention, for example, stipulates that the obligations are incumbent on the
parties under international law, and not only the law of the sea: "States Parties shall fulfil in
good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute
an abuse of right." Article 301 continues by linking the exercise by states of their rights and
performance of their duties under the Convention to observance of "the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."
Provisional measures were granted to defuse the tense standoff (para. 97). The Tribunal's
order states, "[A]ny act which prevents by force a warship from discharging its mission and
duties is a source of conflict that may endanger friendly relations among States" (para. 97).
Interlocutory reliefwas awarded to Argentina to avoid an urgent risk of irreparable harm, since
the Libertadwas deemed a tangible expression of the flag state's sovereignty (paras. 94, 100).
The unanimous decision was joined by Judge ad hoc Thomas Mensah, who served as the first
president of ITLOS and in this case was appointed by Ghana.
Public sirring, supra note 10, at 8.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 IC] REp. 14, para. 214
(June 27), quoted in id at 9.
16
17
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The Tribunal ordered Ghana to release the frigate, its commander, and its crew by December 22, and to ensure that the vessel was "resupplied toward that end" (para. 108). Ghana complied with the provisional order. The vessel departed from Ghana on December 19 and was
welcomed back in Argentina on January 9,2013.

****
ARA Libertad marks the twentieth case to be heard by ITLOS. The provisional order merely
concluded the first stage in the litigation between Argentina and Ghana over the detention of
the tall sailing ship. ITLOS acted with dispatch and played a constructive role in a dispute that
appears almost to have spiraled out of control. Argentina submitted a note to the Tribunal on
October 29 and a detailed request for provisional measures on November 14, 2012. The Tribunal began deliberations within two weeks 18 and issued the order for provisional measures on
December 15.
The order is important for upholding the immunity of a warship broadly and inclusively
defined-as a tall sailing ship used for training by the Argentine Navy. ITLOS found that "in
accordance with general international law, a warship enjoys immunity" (para. 95). Perhaps
even more important, the order applied sovereign immunity as a general principle of internationallaw to the internal waters (port) of Ghana, even though Article 32 on sovereign immunity is contained in Part II of UNCLOS on the territorial sea. This finding raises interesting
questions about the scope ofITLOS's jurisdiction beyond the specific provisions of the text of
the Convention.
The Tribunal viewed Article 32 as an effective restatement of customary international law.
The inclusive definition ofsovereign immunity and the applicability to port facilities and internal waters should provide a level of comfort for conventional naval forces concerned about
attempts by coastal states and port states to exercise jurisdiction over warships (and by extension, militaty aircraft). In this regard, ITLOS has left another compelling reason for the United
States to accede to UNCLOS: to take advantage of the dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention.
The interlocutory order also raises questions about how national courts treat waivers of sovereign immunity by foreign governments. Judge Frimpong's interpretation of the waiver clause
means that Argentina would be virtually devoid of sovereignty. Argentina argued that military
property is absolutely excluded from any kind of execution measure by a foreign state; or (in
the alternative) even if a state can waive immunity from execution, the waiver must be explicit
and specific to the related militaty asset at stake. As a rule, a general waiver cannot be applied
to military or diplomatic assets. 19 The waiver of immunity typically involves jurisdiction to
adjudicate, but not enforcement against any state asset whatsoever its nature.
Ghana never contested the immunity of the warship under customary international lawsidestepping the core equity at stake by relying on a bare textual argument grounded in
18 The Tribunal conducted oral proceedings on November 29 and 30,2012. See Public sitting, supra note 10,
at 9; Liberrad, Docs. ITLOS/PV.12/C20/2 (Nov. 29, 2012); ITLOS/PV.12/C20/3-4 (Nov. 30, 2012).
19 Argentina Request, supra note 6, paras. 40, 41; see also XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 404 (2002) ("Cerrain categories of property are regarded as so sensitive that they are under special
protection and absolutely immune from execution .... "), quoted in id., para. 47.
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UNCLOS. Under such circumstances, whatever the relative strength of the arguments surrounding Article 32 for jurisdictional purposes, Ghana did not assert (and was denied) a legal
right to hold the ship under international law more generally.
On the broad question of immunity, the ITLOS order bears a striking resemblance to the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in the famous 1812 case of The Schooner Exchange.2° There, a
schooner owned by John McFaddon and William Greetham had been seized by order of
Napoleon Bonaparte on December 30, 1810. The ship was armed and converted into a public
vessel and renamed Balou. During a deployment to the West Indies in the summer of 1811,
the Balou pulled into port in Philadelphia, and McFaddon and Greetham sought to recover
their vessel. The district court dismissed their action in libel on the ground that a public armed
vessel of a foreign power at peace with the United States was not subject to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts. The circuit court reversed; on appeal to the Supreme Court, ChiefJ ustice Marshall
upheld the district court's order, stating that the "whole civilized world" concurred in the construction that
[a warship] constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under the immediate
and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him in national objects. He has many
and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference
of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take place without affecting his power and his
dignity. The implied license therefore under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may
reasonably be construed, and it seems to the Court, ought to be construed, as containing
an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she claims the
rites of hospitality. 21
Notably, the Tribunal found that Article 32 may apply to Ghana's internal waters. It is
uncertain whether the Annex VII arbitral tribunal will apply the text of Article 32 to internal
waters during the merits phase. A strong case can be made that Article 32 affirmatively preserves
warship immunity under customary international law, rather than that the issue lies entirely
outside the Convention and is therefore dependent on customary law. In the choice between
reading Article 32 to exclude immunity under the Convention and reading the article to incorporate immunity under international law by reference, the text and negotiations suggest that
the latter analysis is stronger. The final decision, however, awaits an order on the merits.
In the United States, the case once again raised the issue of ratification ofUNCLOS. An editorial in the Wall StreetJournal on December 24, 2012, called the order more evidence of the
treaty's assault on national (this time Ghana's) sovereignty.2 2 ITLOS, the editorial argued, had
overlooked that Argentina had waived immunity and made the error of treating the vessel "as
if this is an actual warship." Ghana was "bullied by a global tribunal." American courts, Congress, and the president, however, have always protected the sovereign immunity of warships,
even ofsuch unconventional vessels as the three-masted frigate Libertad. The order will be particularly valuable for the protection of U.S. Navy warships that are not conventional fighting
vessels, such as the naval auxiliary special mission ships USNS Impeccable, USNS Victorious,
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
Id. at 144.
22 Editorial, Lawless at Sea, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2012, at A12. The incident provides "[aJ case study in the
dangers of the Law of the Sea Treaty." !d., text box.
20
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USNS Sumner, and USNS Bowditch, which may not be painted warship gray or carry armament. The United States recognizes sovereign immunity for American warships even after they
have sunk, which underscores the great weight placed on the preservation of immunity to foreign states' legal process.23 Consequently, the preservation of sovereign immunity for warships
in this order, even for an unconventional training ship and even only as a prima facie showing
during an interlocutory appeal, is an encouraging precedent for stability of expectations and
the rule of law at sea and in port.
lAMES KRASKA

United States Naval War College
Treaty on the Functioning o/the European Union-amendment-simplified revision procedure-economic
and monetary policy--validity o/stability mechanism for euro area member states
PRINGLE v. IRELAND. Case C-370/12. At http://curia.europa.eu.
Court ofJustice of the European Union, November 27, 2012.

In the judgment Pringle v. Ireland,l the full Court ofJustice of the European Union (Court
or ECl) upheld the validity of the decision of the European Council enabling the simplified
amendment of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 2 In its Decision
2011 I 199/EU, the Council had provided for the establishment of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) by those member states of the European Union (Union or EU) that
had adopted the euro as their common currency and legal tender. The Court also found in this
judgment that those member states had not violated EU law by negotiating and concluding the
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty).3 The Court based the
latter finding on the long-awaited clarification of the scope and content of the TFEU's "nobailout clause" (Art. 125(1)), which had been the subject of intense controversies among legal
scholars, in particular in Germany.
The European sovereign debt crisis started when the newly elected Greek government
announced in late 2009 that the real Greek budget deficit was much higher than the one previously notified to the European Commission. In the spring of2010, it became obvious that
Greece was going to lose access to market financing for its enormous budget deficit. The European institutions and the member states of the euro area repeatedly stressed their willingness
to "take determined and coordinated action, if needed, to safeguard financial stability in the
President William J. Clinton issued the following statement during the last hours of his presidency: "Pursuant
the United States retains tide indefinitely to its sunken State
craft unless tide has been abandoned or transferred .... " Statement on United States Policy for the Protection
of Sunken Warships, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 195, 195 (Jan. 22, 2001), 2001 WLNR4638318; seea/so
David J. Bederman, Congress Enacts Increased Protections for Sunken Military Craft, 100 AJIL 649 (2006); Jason R.
Harris, Protecting Sunken Warships as Objects Entitled to Sovereign Immunity, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 101
(2002); J. Ashley Roach, France Concetks United States Has Title to CSS Alabama, 85 AJIL 381 (l991).
I Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370112 (Eur. Ct. Justice Nov. 27, 2012), at hrtp:llcuria.europa.eu.
2 Consolidated Version of the Treary on the Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C 115) 47, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu.This is the version of the TFEU referred to by the Court in this
case.
3 Treary Establishing the European Stabiliry Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, at http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/
esm_treary_en.pdf.
23
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euro area as a whole."4 To prevent a Greek default, the member states of the euro area agreed
in May 2010 to a package of bilateral loans to Greece, supplemented by loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time, as it turned out that the Greek package
would not ensure market confidence and stability, rwo new institutions were established: the
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism- based on an EU regulation-and the temporary European Financial Stability Facility-a special purpose vehicle under Luxembourg private law that was guaranteed by the euro area member states. In addition, the IMF committed
itself to further financial assistance worth 250 billion euros.
The overall "rescue umbrella" was designed to provide financing of up to 750 billion euros
to other member states that might face unfavorable market situations. In the ensuing period,
these funds were used to make loans to Ireland and Portugal, and again to Greece. Despite the
substantial amount of "money in the window," participants in the financial market remained
skeptical about the ability of the euro area and its member states to solve the crisis and return
to sound fiscal policies. This skepticism more and more gained the character of a self-fulfilling
prophecy, as the need for a continuous rollover of their debt burden makes countries extremely
vulnerable to changes in the market perception of their credirworthiness.
In reaction to the ongoing crisis, the European Council agreed in December 2010 on the
need to establish a permanent stability mechanism. Giving in to German demands, it decided
to initiate a procedure for the limited amendment of the TFEU. On March 25, 2011, the European Council adopted Decision 20111199/EU amending TFEU Article 136 by adding a new
paragraph 3, which states: "The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as
a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made
subject to strict conditionality."5
The decision was based on the "simplified revision procedure" under Article 48(6) of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU), which had been added by the Lisbon Treaty.6 That procedure waived the requirement for a convention and a conference of the representatives of the
member states as specified under the ordinary revision procedure ofTEU Article 48(2) and
replaced it with a European Council decision. Such a decision must still be "approved by
the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." But the
scope ofapplication of the simplified revision procedure is limited. It applies only to Part Three
of the TFEU and shall not increase the competences conferred on the Union in the TFEU
and TEU.
After lengthy negotiations, on Febtuary 2,2012, the euro area member states finally concluded the ESM Treaty and initiated their respective ratification procedures. The treaty establishes the European Stability Mechanism as an international financial institution (Art. 1(1))
tasked with mobilizing funding and providing stability support "under strict conditionality ...
to the benefit ofESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing
4 Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union (Feb. 11,2010); Statement by the
Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area (Mar. 25, 2010), at http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocsl
cms_dataldocs/pressdatalen/edI12856.pdf, and 113563.pdf, respectively.
5 Council Decision 201 11 199/EU, Art. 1,2011 O.J. (L 91) 1,2.
6 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Art. 48(6), Sept. 5, 2008, as amended by Treaty of
Lisbon, Dec. 13,2007,2008 O.J. (C 115) 13, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu.This is the version of the TEU
referred to by the Court in this case.
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problems, if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and
of its Member States" (Art. 3).1
The dispute addressed by the ECJ in this judgment arose out of an action brought against
the government of the Republic ofIreland and its attorney general by Thomas Pringle, a citizen
ofIreland and a member of the Dail Eireann, the lower house of the Irish national parliament.
In his action, Pringle claimed (besides charging under Irish law that Ireland's ESM participation was unconstitutional) that Decision 2011/199/EU had not been lawfully adopted pursuant to the simplified revision procedure under TEU Article 48(6). He argued that the
amendment entailed an alteration of the competences of the Union and was inconsistent both
with provisions ofEU law concerning economic and monetary union and with general principles of EU law, in particular the principle of legal certainty.
The Supreme Court of Ireland rejected the claims submitted by Pringle under Irish constitutionallaw and his request that it grant an injunction restraining the Irish government from
ratifying the ESM Treaty.BIt did, however, refer two questions and one optional question to
the ECJ:
whether European Council Decision 20111199/EU was valid;
whether a member state of the European Union whose currency is the euro was entitled to enter into and ratify an international agreement such as the ESM Treaty; and
if the European Council decision was held valid, whether the entitlement of a member state to enter into and ratify an international agreement such as the ESM Treaty
was subject to the entry into force of that decision. (Para. 28t
Before addressing these questions, the Court of] ustice had to deal with arguments questioning the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the reference. The European Council
and several member states first challenged the Court's jurisdiction to review the compatibility
of the decision with substantive primary EU law, on the ground that TFEU Article 267 provides for references regarding only the interpretation, but not the validity of the TEU and
TFEU. Because the decision creates new primary law, they claimed, it cannot be subject to judicial scrutiny by the Court of] ustice; holding otherwise would preclude the member states from
amending these instruments as the "masters of the treaties." But the new, simplified category
of treaty amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is limited in scope and subject to
certain procedural requirements. Its central feature is its initiation by a European Council decision (TEU Art. 48(6), (7)), that is, an actofan institution of the Union (TFEU Art. 288; TEU
Arts. 13(1), 15) that in principle can be subject to legal sctutiny by the ECJ (TEU Art. 19(1);
TFEU Arts. 263, 267(b)). Accordingly, the advocate general and the Court accepted the
admissibility of the reference and the jurisdiction of the Court (paras. 31-37), though limited
to reviewing whether the strictures imposed by TEU Article 48(6) had been obeyed-namely,
that Decision 2011/199/EU will not increase the Union's competences and that it may revise
7 For a more derailed accoum of the comem of the ESM Treaty, see Judgmem, paras. 8-23, and Christoph
Ohler, The European Stability Mechanism: The Long Road to Financial Stability in the EuroArea, 54 GER. Y.B. INT'L
L. 47 (2011).
S Pringle v. Ireland, [2012] IESC 47, No. 339/2012, at http://www.couns.ie.
9 ld., attachmem, pt. VI.
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all or some of the provisions only of Part Three of the TFEU ("Union Policies and Internal
Actions").
Second, Ireland contended that Pringle ought to have challenged the validity of the decision
directly by an action for annulment under TFEU Article 263. As the two-month time limit for
such an action had already expired when Pringle submitted his complaint, the Irish government claimed that the indirect challenge amounted to a circumvention of the applicable procedural provisions that should therefore not be considered. The Court correctly rejected this
Irish claim because a direct action for annulment would not have been admissible beyond
doubt (paras. 38-44) (quite the contrary, as it would have required that Decision 2011/
199/EU was at least of "direct concern" to Pringle).
The Court then turned to the substantive issues raised by the reference: whether the amendment envisaged by Decision 2011/199/EU solely concerned provisions of Part Three of the
TFEU and, second, whether it increased the competences of the Union. With regard to the
latter, the Court examined whether the insertion ofTFEU Article 136(3) grants competence
to the member states that would encroach on the Union's exclusive competence over monetary
policy for the euro area (TFEU Art. 3(1)(c)), and whether the establishment of the ESM
improperly encroached upon the competence of the Union in the field of monetary union and
economic policy coordination. The Union has exclusive competence over monetary policy for
the euro area member states, which means that member states may not enact legally binding
acts in this field unless the Union expressly empowers them to (TFEU Arts. 2(1), 3(1)(c)). As
"monetary policy" is not defined precisely in the TEU and TFEU, the Court compared the
objectives of the monetary policy of the euro area (primarily maintaining price stability, TFEU
Art. 127(1)) with the objectives of the stability mechanism (safeguarding the stability of the
euro area) and concluded that granting financial assistance "clearly does not fall within monetary policy" (para. 57). The Court then compared the stability mechanism envisaged in TFEU
Article 136(3) with the reformed framework ofeconomic governance in the Union, which consists of various regulations and directives enacted since 2010, pointed to their essentially preventive character, and contrasted that with the function of the stability mechanism, which is
to serve as a crisis instrument in situations where the preventive instruments have failed (paras.
58 - 59). In sum, the Court concluded that the establishment of a stability mechanism does not
fall under monetary policy as defined in the TFEU, but under economic policy (para. 60),
which is not within the Union's exclusive competence. Consequently, the member states are
entitled to enter into an international agreement between themselves as long as they do not
create legal norms that violate provisions ofEU law in that field. As no EU legislation provides
for a permanent stability mechanism like the ESM and since the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism governs financial assistance only by the European Union as a separate legal
entity (but not by the member states), the Court did not find any conflict between the ESM
Treaty and EU legislation as regards economic policy coordination (paras. 64-69).
The second question referred by the Irish Supreme Court concerned the compatibility of
the ESM Treaty as such with several provisions of the TEU and TFEU, as well as general principles ofEU law. As the referring court did not adequately explain the relevance of some of the
provisions mentioned in its request for a preliminary ruling, the Court ofJustice held the second question to be partly inadmissible (paras. 82- 87). The following examination of the EC], s
response touches on many of the problems that were being discussed in legal writing prior to
the judgment. We will focus here on those aspects that are most pertinent to this discussion.
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Initially, that part of the judgment again considered the competences of the Unionessentially, whether the conclusion of the ESM Treaty by the member states (regardless or in
spite of the still pending entry into force of the Council decision) encroached upon these competences. For the same reasons as in the earlier part of the judgment, the Court held that the
establishment of the ESM Treaty did not constitute a measure of monetary policy and therefore
did not fall within the exclusive competence of the Union. It also found that the ESM may
neither set key interest rates nor issue euro currency, but must fund grants entirely from paid-in
capital or by issuing financial instruments on the financial markets (paras. 93-96). Notably,
the Court at this point also referred to the necessary respect forTFEU Article 123(1), the prohibition of monetary financing, which had gravely concerned the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in its judgment on Germany's ratification of the ESM Treaty in September 2012. 10
One may read this reference-like others in the judgment-as a friendly signal to the German
Court, indicating that the Luxembourg Court would also not permit the ESM to have access
to refinancing by the European Central Bank.
The Court then examined whether the ESM Treaty could encroach upon the competence
deriving from TFEU Article 3(2), which grants the Union exclusive treaty-making power if
the conclusion of an international agreement "may affect common rules or alter their scope."
According to the Court, this provision also applies to agreements between the member states
themselves, but the Court did not find that the ESM Treaty affected common rules or altered
their scope (paras. lO3-07). As for the ESM Treaty's provisions on strict economic conditionality, the Court held that they did not affect the competence of the EU Council under
TFEU Article 126 to issue recommendations to a member state with excessive deficits (paras.
108-14).
The analysis ofTFEU Article 125(1) is certainly the core and most important part of the
judgment, as numerous commentators had claimed that practically all the rescue packages violated this no-bailout clause. The Court began by observing that the wording of the clause does
not prohibit the Union or the member states from "granting any form of financial assistance
whatever to another Member State" (para. 130). The Court supported this verbal interpretation of Article 125(1) by a comparison with the phrasing ofTFEU Articles 122 and 123 and
their content (permitting financial aid to member states and prohibiting overdrafts or other
credit facilities, respectively) (paras. 131-32). Having established that some forms of financial
assistance may thus be in conformity with Article 125(1), the Court explored the objective of
the provision so as to identify which forms might be permissible. It found the overall rationale
ofArticle 125(1) to reside in ensuring both that member states follow sound budgetary policies
and that they remain subject to the logic of the financial market when they enter into debt (para.
135). Consequently, the Court reasoned that financial assistance would be prohibited if it
diminished "the incentive of the recipient Member State to conduct a sound budgetary policy"
(para. 136).
In an interesting twist, the Court then referred to the wording of the future Article 136(3)
of the TFEU to shed light on the meaning of its Article 125(1). This is interesting because the
10 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Coun], Sept. 12,2012, docket nos. 2 BvR 1390/12, 2
BvR 1421112, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, at hnp:llwww.bundesverfassungs
gericht.de/pressemitteilungenlbrgI2-067en.html Oinks to full German text and extracts in English).
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question at this point was whether the ESM Treaty (not the amendment of the TFEU) is compatible with EU law, and especially because the Court later found that the legality of the ESM
Treaty did not depend on the entry into force of Decision 20111199/EU, that is, the amendment ofArticle 136. In its further analysis, the Co un returned to the wording ofArticle 125( 1)
and considered whether the different kinds of financial instruments provided for by the ESM
are permitted under the various alternatives of Article 125(1), and confirmed their legality
(paras. 138-42).
A subsequent part of the judgment addresses the question whether the euro area member
states could entrust the European Commission, the European Central Bank, or the Court of
Justice with tasks under the ESM Treaty. Such allocation could be contrary to the principle
of attributed powers of the institutions under TEU Article 13(2). The advocate general had
stressed two points in favor of the legality of this institution borrowing: a decision by the governments of all member states adopted on June 20, 2011, which acknowledged that the ESM
Treaty would" contain provisions under which the European Commission and the European
Central Bank are to perform tasks provided for in the Treaty," 1 1 and the fact that neither the
Commission nor the central bank was obligated to carry out the tasks imposed on it by the ESM
Treaty. 12 The Court ofJ ustice, however, followed different reasoning. In its view, it was decisive that the tasks entrusted to the Commission and the central bank outside the actual EU law
framework "do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on those institutions
by the [TEU and TFEU]" (para. 158). Notably, the Court did not consider at this point
whether it made a difference if-as in the case of the so-called Fiscal Compact of March 2,
2012 13-not all member states supported the use of the institutions outside the EU legal
framework stricto sensu. With regard to the role assigned to the ECJ itself, the Court endorsed
the argument by the advocate general that disputes between the ESM and one or more of its
members are-since all ESM members are also EU member states-de facto disputes between
EU member states that can be submitted to the Court of Justice under TFEU Article 273
(paras. 170-77).
Last, the Court answered optional question 3, holding that the right of member states to
conclude the ESM Treaty did not depend on the validity of Decision 2011/199/EU (and the
entry into force of new Article 136(3)), as-according to its prior analysis-this decision confirmed a right the member states possessed anyway (paras. 183-85).

****
The judgment of the Court must be praised for most of its conclusions. The academic discussion ofTFEU Article 125(1) had increasingly departed from strict legal arguments and in
particular frequently ignored the wording of the provision. Most commentators focused on the
moral hazards purportedly triggered if member states could pursue unsound budgetary policies
11 Pringle v. Ireland, Case3701 12, View ofAdvocate General] uliane Kokou, para. 172 (Oct. 26, 2012) (quoting
Decision of me Representatives of me Governments of me Member States of me European Union, Annex, Council
Cover Note, Doc. 12114/11 (June 24, 2011), at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:620 12CP0370:EN:HTML.
12 Id., paras. 175, 181.
13 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetaty Union, Mar. 2, 2012, at
http://european-council.europa.eulmedial639235/stOOtscg26_en12.pdf. All EU member states except me United
Kingdom and me Czech Republic are parties to me treaty.
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and then get a "cheap bailout." These arguments were misguided in many respects. First, the
conditionality attached to the loan programs is anything but cheap, in political as well as social
terms. The Irish, Portuguese, and Spanish governments were not seeking shelter under the
umbrella but instead had to be pulled under it by the rest of the euro area members. Moreover,
funds will not be granted automatically (but with the solid expectation that similar cases will
be treated similarly). Slovakia abstained from the Greek bailout, Finland preserved preferential
insurance, and Cyprus has been awaiting a decision on its application for financial assistance
(to recapitalize its banking sector) for nine months at the time of writing. Furthermore, it
would have been surprising if a provision ofEU law whose wording does not explicitly prohibit
the member states from taking a certain course of action were interpreted as restricting sovereignty more than necessaty. Finally, it was legally and politically almost absurd to purport
to interpret the TEU and TFEU in a way that would have left the euro area member states helpless when the danger of the breakup of the euro area was real.
The consequences of the judgment may nevertheless be problematic because of its possible
effect on the European integration process as a whole. The (correct) finding that the member
states remain competent to conclude international agreements complementing EU law in a
central policy field like the economic and monetary union may be seen as a necessary corollary
to the construction of the European Union as Staatenverbund (association of sovereign states).
But it also reveals the insufficiencies and the lack of flexibility of the existing legal framework.
In addition, the conclusion of agreements such as the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact significantly increases the already high complexity of the wider legal framework of the European
Union and makes it even more difficult to ensure the coherence, transparency, efficiency, and
democratic legitimacy of the integration process.
The judgment also deserves to be critiqued on one technical point. As pointed out above,
the Court found that Article 3(2) of the TFEU (on the exclusivity of the Union's treaty-making
power) also precluded inter se agreements by the EU member states. This conclusion is by no
means convincing. Article 3(2) applies-according to its wording~only to international
agreements, those governed by title V of Part Five of the treaty (entitled "International Agreements") and defined as "agreement[s] with one or more third countries or international organisations" (TFEU Art. 216(1». Article 3(2) was designed to prevent the member states from
entering into agreements that would be binding under public international law despite being
contrary to EU law. This underlying reasoning does not apply to inter se agreements, over
which EU law prevails anyway because of its primacy.
Overall, the Court of} ustice has now struck a balance between fiscal self-responsibility and
the solidarity and sovereignty of member states. Even ifthe European sovereign debt crisis is not yet
over, some of the most pressing legal questions regarding the crisis have been settled and the
legality of the "rescue policy" and its core elements can no longer be substantially challenged.
Nevertheless, further proceedings are pending, in particular before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, that concern the announcement by the European Central Bank in September 2012 of its
intention to buy government bonds of euro area countries without limits (so-called outright
market operations), if it should be the only way to prevent the breakup of the euro area.
CHRISTOPH W. HERRMANN

University ofPassau, Germany
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European Convention on Human Rights-Article 3-torture or inhuman or degrading treatment-forcible
repatriation ofasylum seekers-collective expulsion-right to a remedy
HIRSI JAMAA v. ITALY. Application No. 27765/09. At http://www.echr.coe.int.
European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), February 23,2012.

In a unanimous judgment in the case Hirsijamaa v. Italy, I the Grand Chamber of the Euro~
pean Court of Human Rights (Court) held that Italy's "push back" operations interdicting
intending migrants and refugees at sea and returning them to Libya amounted to a violation
of the prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR or Convention), 2 the prohibition of collective expulsions under Article 4 of Protocol
4 to the Convention, and the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.
Hirsi Jamaa is the Court's first judgment on the interception of migrants at sea and it addresses
issues concerning the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1979
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as well as the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. 3
The applicants, eleven Somali and thirteen Eritrean nationals, together with some two hun~
dred other persons, were on board three vessels intercepted by the Italian Revenue Police
(Guardia di Finanza) and Coast Guard on May 6,2009, approximately thirty-five nautical
miles south of the Italian island of Lampedusa in an area that may be considered, for present
purposes, as high seas. 4 The operation formed part of a series of migration control efforts (so~
called push-back operations) undertaken by Italy during the period from May 6 to November
6, 2009, aimed at interrupting the flow of refugees and migrants by sea from Libya toward Ital~
ian territory. The interdictions were conducted in agreement with Libya under bilateral treaties
between the two states and were intended to apply European Union policies on border sur~
veillance and migration control. All the individuals were taken on board the Italian military
vessels where their personal effects, including identity documents, were confiscated. None
were interviewed, nor was any information given to them as to their destination. On their
return to Tripoli, they were handed over to the Libyan authorities (paras. 9 -14). Subsequently,
two of the applicants died "in unknown circumstances" and fourteen were granted refugee sta~
tus by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Tripoli (paras. 15, 16).
1 Hirsi Jamaa v.ltaly, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23,2012) [hereinafter J udgmentl. Judgments and
decisions of the Court cited herein are available online at hrtp:llwww.echr.coe.int.
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No.
5,213 UNTS 222.
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at hrtp:llwww.un.orglDepts/los/; International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, TIAS No. 11093, 1405 UNTS 118; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July
28,1951,189 UNTS 150, as amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967,19 UST 6223,
606 UNTS 267.
4 The interdiction and most of the travel took place in Libya's exclusive economic zone, declared in 2009. General
People's Committee Decision No. 260 of A.J. 1377, Concerning the Declaration of the Exclusive Economic
Zone of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (May 31, 2009), at http://www.un.orglDepts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFlLESllby_2009_dedaration3.pdf. Since, according to Article 58(1) of
UNCLOS, supra note 3, all states enjoy the freedom of navigation applicable to the high seas in the exclusive economic zone of other states, the distinction does not result in any practical consequences.
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The applicants brought their case directly to the Court under the provisions ofECHRArticle 34, which permits "applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group
of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties."
Italy made several preliminary objections (including by challenging the right of the applicants'
attorneys to represent them and the applicants' failure to exhaust available local remedies),
which were rejected. The Court also rejected Italy's jurisdictional argument that the vessels had
been intercepted "in the context of the rescue on the high seas of persons in distress," an obligation imposed by international law (including the Law of the Sea Convention and the
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue), and that this "rescue" in no way constituted "a
maritime police operation" and therefore did not involve an exercise of "absolute and exclusive
control" over the applicants (paras. 64-65, 95).5
Substantively, the applicants contended that Italy had breached its obligations under the
Convention both by returning them to Libya, where they were likely to suffer treatment prohibited by Article 3, and by handing them over to the Libyan authorities, who were likely to
send them back to their countries of origin, where they also risked treatment contrary to Article
3. 6 More particularly, the applicants contended that they were victims of an arbitrary refoulement and had been denied the opportunity to challenge their forced return or to seek international refugee protection. The government countered that at the time Libya was a "safe host
country" and that the applicants had never requested political asylum in Italy or any other form
of international protection (paras. 96-97).
In its analysis the Court first stressed that "expulsion, extradition or any other measure to
remove an alien may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility
of the expelling State under the Convention" (para. 114). The prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment has an "absolute character" (para. 120) and qualifies the right
to control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens (para. 113), since Article 3 implies the
obligation not to expel the individual to another state "where substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country" (para. 114, emphasis added).
The existence of such a risk must be assessed, the Court said, "primarily with reference to those
facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of
removal" (para. 121).
In light of the numerous reports by international organizations, states, and nongovernmental organizations concerning the situation in Libya at the time (paras. 123-30), the Court concluded, the Italian authorities "knew or should have known that, as irregular migrants, [the
applicants] would be exposed in Libya to treatment in breach of the Convention" (para. 131).
Moreover, with regard to "indirect removal" to third states, the Court similarly found ample
5 The Court's rejection of this argument was particularly based on declarations by Italian officials in the aftermath
of the operation. See, for example, the statements ofRoberro Maroni, minister of the interior, to the Italian Parliament on May 14, 2009, at hrrp:llwww.camera.it/_datillegl 61lavori/stenografici/sed 177/pdfsOO 5.pdf, and on
May 25,2009, at http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/00424000.pdf (in Italian).
6 In their pleadings and at oral argument, the applicants also alleged the use of excessive force, seizure of documents and other items, and other mistreatment by the Italian authorities on board the military vessels, but these
claims were not addressed in the Court's final judgment. See Grand Chamber Hearing, Hirsi and Others v. Italy
(J une 22, 2011), at hrtp:llwww.echr.coe.int/ECHRlEN/HeaderlPress/MulrimedialWebcasts+ oH public +
hearingsIWebcasts20 II.htm; see also UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Submission in the Case of Hirsi and
Others v. Italy, para. 2.2.6 (Mar. 2010), at hrrp:llwww.unhcr.orglrefworldldocid/4b97778d2.html.
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evidence to indicate prima facie that the situation in Somalia and Eritrea "posed and continues
to pose widespread serious problems of insecurity" (para. 151) and that the Italian authorities
knew or should have known that the applicants lacked sufficient protection against arbitrary
return (para. 156). In both contexts, therefore, Italy's actions in returning the applicants to
Libya violated Article 3.
The Court also found that the push-back operations violated the prohibition against collective expulsions in Article 4 ofECHR Protocol 4.7 This case was the first time the Court was
called upon to assess the application of that article to the removal ofaliens to a third state carried
out outside national territory (para. 169). In fact, Italy had argued that the provision did not
apply since the applicants had been trying to enter its territory and the measures could not
therefore be considered an expulsion (para. 172). The Court disagreed. In light of the travaux
preparatoires of Article 4, its evident purpose and meaning, and the need to apply it to contemporary conditions in accord with the principle of effectiveness (paras. 174-79), the Court
concluded that the provision applies to "the removal ofaliens carried out in the context ofinterceptions on the high seas ... the effect of which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of the State or even to push them back to another State" (para. 180).
As to the procedural obligations under ECHR Article 13, Italy had claimed that the factual
circumstances of the operation made it practically impossible to provide an effective remedy
for the applicants while on board the Italian vessels and that the applicants could have brought
a case in Italian courts for compensation after their return to Libya (paras. 191-92). The point
at issue was whether this ex post possibility was sufficient to constitute an "effective remedy"
within the meaning ofArticle 13. The Court said that the remedies envisaged by Article 13 may
vary but must be effective "in practice as well as in law" (para. 197), and, in the case of removal,
must permit "independent and rigorous sctutiny"g and be capable of having a "suspensive
effect" (para. 199). In this instance, the applicants had no access either to information about
where they were being taken or to a procedure to assess their personal circumstances, much less
to one that could have prevented their return to Libya. They were thus denied the protections
called for by Article 13 (and certainly could not be criticized for having failed to exhaust domestic remedies) (para. 207).
Having found that Italy had violated Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention and Article 4 of
Protocol 4, the Court not only awarded the applicants fifteen thousand euros each for "nonpecuniary damage" (para. 213), but also ordered the Italian government to undertake "all
possible steps to obtain assurances from the Libyan authorities that the applicants will not
be subjected to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention or arbitrarily repatriated" (para. 211).
An extensive concurring opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque examined the "intrinsic
link" between "the international protection of refugees, on the one hand, and the compatibility
of immigration and border control policies with international law, on the other hand." While
acknowledging the right of states to control their borders, Judge Pinto also noted that under
the Convention "a refugee cannot be subjected to refoulement to his or her country of origin
7 Protocol No.4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing
Cenain Rights and Freedoms Other Than Those Already Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol
Thereto, An. 4, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1963, ETS No. 46, as amended by Protocol No. 11, ETS No. 155
(entered into force Nov. 1, 1998), at http://www.coe.int.
8 Judgment, para. 198 (quoting Shamayev v. Georgia, 2005-III ECR 153, para. 460).
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or to any other country where he or she risks incurring serious harm caused by any identified
or unidentified person or public or private entity." Indeed, the content of the right to international protection is the same under human rights law and refugee law and does not depend
on whether an individual is a de jure or de facto refugee. "A person does not become a refugee
because of recognition, but is recognised because he or she is a refugee." In the view of Judge
Pinto, the prohibition of refoulement is today "an absolute obligation of all States," a "principle
of customary international law, " and" a rule ofjus cogens" that allows no derogation and applies
to "extra-territorial State actions, including action occurring on the high seas."9 In consequence, the necessary procedural protections (including individual evaluation of asylum
claims) are "not limited to the land and maritime territory of a State but also apply on the
high seas."

****
The judgment adds significantly to European jurisprudence on three critical subjects: the
extraterritorial application of human rights; the treatment to be accorded to migrants, refugees,
and asylum seekers; and the rules governing interdiction of persons at sea.
The increase in activities carried out by state organs beyond national boundaries- be they
de-territorialized migration controls, targeted killings, law enforcement activities duting military occupation, or others- has brought to the forefront the issue of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. Coming shortly after the watershed Al-Skeini judgment, 10 the
Hirsi Jamaa judgment confirms and strengthens the Court's more recent liberal jurisprudence
aimed at ensuring accountability for state action outside national boundaries. 11 It upholds the
existence of two alternative grounds for the applicability of the Convention: dejure jutisdiction
and de facto jurisdiction (para. 80).12 Interestingly, the Court adopts an "objective" assessment
of the existence of jurisdiction within the meaning ofArticle 1 of the Convention. Italy argued
that it had not exercised jurisdiction, since the only aim of the operation was to come to the
rescue of the boats and their passengers, and not to enforce its migration laws. The Court
replied that "[s]peculation as to the nature and purpose of the intervention of the Italian ships
on the high seas would not lead the Court to any other conclusion" (para. 81). The existence
of de facto jurisdiction must be assessed objectively on the basis of the facts and not the intention of the state. While the objectives of a state in pursuing a specific course of action can be
relevant in assessing whether it has complied with the applicable human rights standards, good
intentions alone cannot justify a factual violation of those standards. This general statement
is to be welcomed since it strengthens the rule oflaw and legal certainty, and can be of guidance
in other cases, on land as well as at sea.
Coming at a time when more than one state has tried to evade the applicability of its human
rights obligations vis-a-vis migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers by de-territorializing border
9 In this connection, and "[wlith all due respect," Judge Pinto explicitly criticized the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). The Concurring Opinion ofJudge Pinto
de Albuquerque is attached to the Judgment. The paragraphs are not numbered and emphasis is omitted from all
the quotations here except the first and the seventh.
10 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 7,2011) (repotted by Misa ZgonecROZej at 106 AJIL 131 (2012».
11 Medvedyevv. France, App. No. 3394/03, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (2010).
12 See also id., para. 67; Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. SEll, paras.
87-88 (2009).
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controls, including, bur not limited to, by undertaking push-back operations on the high seas,
the Hirsi Jamaa case provides helpful guidance that is relevant beyond European space. Furthermore, most of the Court's findings may well apply to any kind of migration control, be it
by sea, by land, or by air. The prohibition of returning individuals to states where there is a real
risk of torture, and the de facto prohibition of push-back operations that do not allow for the
personal identification of the individuals involved and examination of each one's personal circumstances, may also work for other rypes of migration control.
The link between the extraterritorial exercise of migration control and the extraterritorial
application of the prohibition enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol 4 may constitute a significant
check on states' efforts to delocalize migration control and asylum processing. The Court seems
to warn states that whenever their organs impede collective group entrance into their territory,
whether at their own borders, on the high seas, or on the territory of another state, they may
incur responsibiliry for breach ofArticle 4. It does not matter, in this respect, if the persons are
also returned to another country or are simply stopped from crossing the border (para. 180).
The conclusions of the Court could therefore also be applied to interdiction operations aimed
at preventing vessels from sailing into the territory of the destination country.
What options does a state have in implementing these principles through its immigration
policies? It may still intercept boats with migrants in all cases allowed by the law of the sea. 13
When the lives of the persons on board are in danger, the state is obligated to give assistance.
Upon interception, however, the state must take steps to identify the individuals, and only then
may it decide whether to bring them to its territory or to disembark them in another state. In
the latter case, the state will have to determine if, in the light of their personal characteristics
and the situation in the receiving country, returning the migrants will pur them at a real risk
of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment. Even if they do not make any claim for asylum
or invoke any remedy for the suspension of their transfer, the intercepting state bears the burden of assessing the situation proprio motu.
If the intercepting state decides that there is no risk under Article 3, it must inform the individuals of their destination and make sure that each of them has access to an effective remedy
to challenge the decision, with "suspensive effect," before they are transferred. Since it may be
impractical, if not infeasible, to carry out all these obligations and to provide for such mechanisms while migrants are on board state vessels, the migrants would have to be brought to a
safe place where they could invoke their rights. This may be the territory of the intercepting
state or that of another state, as long as the Convention's requirements are respected.
Nothing in the Hirsi Jamaa judgment prevents the application of its conclusions to all
migrants, be they refugees/asylum seekers or not. The Court'S opinion consistently refers to
"persons," "applicants," or "migrants," and its description of the appalling conditions in Libya
focuses on the treatment of "clandestine" or "irregular" migrants (para. 125). It follows that
13 The one point that has not been addressed at all by the Court and consequently remains open concerns the
legality of push-back operations themselves, even in situations where the modalities fully conform to the requirements of human rights law. According to one of the best-established principles of international law, states have
exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying their flag and navigating on the high seas. UNCLOS, supra note 3, Art. 92( 1).
Even if the vessel is flagIess, as vessels used for travel between Libya and Italy generally are, it is not certain that a
rule has crystallized allowing third states to undertake enforcement action with respect to migrants on board. See
DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAw OF THE SEA 231 (2009).
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a state cannot apply a lower standard than the one prescribed in the judgment by claiming that
the individuals intercepted are "simply" economic migrants. This conclusion is further warranted by the Court's dictum that "problems with managing migratory Rows cannot justify
having recourse to practices which are not compatible with the State's obligations under the
Convention" (para. 179). While refugees and asylum seekers also enjoy rights under other
regimes, these rights are in addition to those afforded by human rights law and therefore must
be added to those indicated by the Court in the Hirsi Jamaa case as applicable to all migrants. 14
Migrants and refugees are of course not the only persons who can be affected by maritime
interdictions. In this regard, two aspects of HirsiJamaa deserve attention as relevant for allindividuals interdicted at sea, regardless of their status. The first concerns the applicability of
human rights obligations in areas beyond the territorial seas of the parties. While the Drieman 15
case testified to the existence of jurisdiction, also for human rights purposes, in the exclusive
economic zone of a state, the Medvedyev, Women on Waves, Xhavara, and Rigopoulosl 6 cases all
point to the fact that interdiction by military or other state-owned vessels against other vessels
on the high seas (or othetwise outside the first state's jurisdiction) brings the persons on board
the targeted vessel within the state's jurisdiction. The same conclusion was arrived at by the
Inter-AIDerican Commission on Human Rights and the Committee Against T orture l7 in two
cases concerning situations mirroring those of the Hirsi Jamaa case. The Hirsi Jamaa judgment
therefore consolidates the law in this respect by incorporating relevant notions of jurisdiction
under the law of the sea into human rights law and using them to determine whether the interdicting state has de jure or de facto jurisdiction. 18
The second significant aspect concerns how human rights obligations, designed with situations on land in mind, must be applied at sea. Nothing in the ECHR or any other human
rights treaty warrants lesser protection. However, states have sometimes tried to justify such
behavior by referring to the practical difficulties arising from the marine environment or
their 0 bligations under the law of the sea. In Hirsi Jamaa, Italy did so by invoking Article
98(l)(b) of the Law of the Sea Convention requiring the rescue of persons in distress at sea
(para. 65). The Court responded that "the special nature of the maritime environment cannot
justify an area outside the law where individuals are covered by no legal system capable of
affording them enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention" (para.
178). In fact, nothing in either the Law of the Sea Convention or other maritime law rules (such
14 All individuals are protected by the global human rights law instruments regardless of their categorization and
some in addition by the ECHR, but only refugees are entitled to the funher protection afforded by the 1951 Geneva
Convention and 1967 Prorocol on refugees, supra note 3, and other relevant instruments. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL
& JANE McADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, ch. 2 (3d ed. 2007).
15 Drieman v. Norway, App. No. 33678/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 4, 2000).
16 Medvedyev, supra note 11, paras. 66-67; Women on Waves v. Ponugal, App. No. 31276/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Feb. 3, 2009) (in French); Xhavara v. Italy, App. No. 39473/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11,2001); Rigopoulos v. Spain,
1999-11 ECR 435 (1999).
17 Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
51/96, OEAlSer.UVIII.95 Doc. 7 rev., at 550 (1997), available at http://www.iachr.org; P.K. v. Spain, Communication No. 323/2007 (Nov. 11,2008), Repon of the Committee Against Tonure 366, UN GAOR, 64th Sess.,
Supp. No. 44, UN Doc. N64/44 (2009).
18 Irini Papanicolopulu, A Missing Part ofthe Law ofthe Sea Convention: Addressing Issues ofState Jurisdiction over
Persons at Sea, in THE LIMITS OF MARITIME JURISDICflON (M. S. Kwon, C. Schofield, & S. Lee eds., fonhcoming
2013).
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as the Maritime Search and Rescue Convention) prevents states from complying with human
rights requirements. While some accommodation may be necessary (for example, to take into
account the time needed for navigation or the limited space on board ships), states cannot use
the "marine" exception to avoid their human rights obligations.
The judgment did not address all concerns. Since Italy has apparently renewed the agreements under which the 2009 push-back operations were carried out, 19 one might ask whether
the outcome of the case would have been different if presented on the basis of events that
occurred after the change ofgovernment in the two states. In light of recent reports, the Libyan
change of government does not seem to justify a different conclusion. 20 In addition, what if
the migrants had not been brought on board the Italian vessel but had simply been left in their
boat and escorted back to Libya? Furthermore, the Court has failed to address the responsibilities of the state in case it does not intervene, or the responsibilities of the international organizations to which it belongs. 21
Major questions also remain with respect to push-back operations by states not party to the
Convention. The findings of the Court, in particular those concerning the extraterritorial
applicability of human rights duties and the prohibition of return that would amount to torture, are capable of implementation beyond the borders of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea.
Yet the same cannot be said for the remedies provided by the ECHR, since the Court can hear
only cases against parties to the Convention.
Finally, the Court's decision to order the Italian government to obtain assurances from the
Libyan authorities that the applicants would not be mistreated or arbitrarily repatriated seems
appropriate since, at the moment of the judgment, most applicants remained in the hands of
the Libyan government. But it is doubtful whether, had Italy actually obtained such assurances
before sending the applicants back to Tripoli, it would have been found in compliance with
the requirements ofArticle 3. Given the well-documented situation of human rights violations
in Libya, the return of the applicants would nonetheless have breached Article 3.
IRINI PAPANICOLOPULU

University o/Glasgow
19 As reported by the Italian news agency ANSA, Intesa tra Italia e Libia su migranti [Agreement Between Italy
and Libya on Migrants] (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:05 PM), at http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/videogallerylitaliaf2012/04/
03/visualizza_new.htmLI60711462.html. According to journalists, the content of the new agreements follows
that of the previous ones. Livia Ermini, Respingimenti, accordi Italia-Libia identici a quando c'era Berlusconi [PushBacks, Italy-Libya Agreements the Same as When Berlusconi Was in Charge], LA REpPUBBLICA.IT, June 19, 2012,
athttp://www.repubblica.iclsolidarietafptofughiI2012/06l19/newsllivia_ermini-37510944/.
20 Report of the High Commissioner Under Human Rights Council Resolution S-15/1, UN Doc. NHRCI
17/45 (June 7,2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRClPagesIlDocuments.aspx; Report of
the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, UN Doc. NHRC/19/68 (Mar. 8, 2012), available at id;
AMNESTI INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REpORT 2012-LIBYA (2012), at http://www.amnesry.orglenlregion/
libyafreport-20 12.
21 This issue was recently submitted to the French courts. Complaint submitted to the Tribunal de Grande
Instance of Paris in the name of four Ethiopian survivors of a failed attempt to reach Italy by sea ftom Libya (Apr.
11,2012), athttp://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/plainte.pdf(in French). Data on the presence of NATO vessels in the
marine area between Italy and Libya, where more than fifteen hundred persons lost their lives in 20 11, are analyzed
in a report on the incident that is the subject of the above complaint. Charles Heller, Lorenw Pezzani, & Situ Studio,
Report on the «Left-to-Die Boat"(Apr. 11, 2012), at http://migrantsatsea.files.wordpress.comI2012/04/forensicoceanography-report-llapril2012.pdf.
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Sierra Leone civil war-individual criminal respomibility--crimes agaimt humanity--war crimes-head
ofstate immunity
Case No. SCSL-03-01-T. Judgment. At http://www.sc-sl.org.
Special Court for Sierra Leone, April 26, 2012.

PROSECUTOR v. TAYLOR.

Case No. SCSL-03-01-T. Sentencing Judgment. At http://www.sc-sl.org.
Special Court for Sierra Leone, May 30, 2012.

PROSECUTOR v. TAYLOR.

On April 26, 2012, Trial Chamber II (Chamber) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court or Court) in The Hague convicted former Liberian president Charles Ghankay
Taylor of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from November 30, 1996, to
January 18, 2002, in the territoty of Sierra Leone during its civil war.l Specifically, Taylor was
found guilty of the crimes against humanity of murder, rape, sexual slavery, enslavement and
other inhumane acts, and the war crimes of committing acts of terror, murder, outrages upon
personal dignity, cruel treatment, pillage, and conscripting or enlisting children under the age
of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
In a separate judgment rendered on May 30, 2012, the Chamber sentenced Taylor to a single
term of fifty years for all the counts on which the accused had been convicted. 2
By way of providing the necessary factual background for judging Taylor's personal guilt,
the judgment recites at some length the events that occurred in Sierra Leone from the end of
November 1996 until the end of the civil war on January 18,2002. During this period, many
attacks against the civilian population took place, including the burning of homes, murder,
sexual violence, physical violence, the illegal recruitment of child soldiers, abduction and
forced labor, and looting. These acts were perpetrated within the broader context of the armed
conflict in Sierra Leone, which had started on March 23, 1991, when the Revolutionaty United
Front (RUF) launched a war from the east of the country near the border with Liberia (paras.

30-70).
The Special Court was established by the United Nations and the government of Sierra
Leone pursuant to an agreement signed on January 16,2002, to prosecute those who bear the
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. 3 Despite
the conclusion of the Abidjan Peace Agreement, signed on November 20, 1996, by President
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and Foday Sankoh (the leader of RUF), the conflict
resumed in January 1997. On May 25, 1997, members of the Sierra Leone army overthrew the
democratically elected government of Kabbah, formed the African Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), and invited RUF to join it in a junta. The joint AFRC/RUF alliance could
control major towns and diamond-producing areas in Sierra Leone, relying on diamond proceeds to fund its fighting. In this regard, Taylor was alleged to be regularly involved with RUF
1 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-0 1-T, Judgmem (Spec. Ce. Sierra Leone Apr. 26, 2012) [hereinafcer
Judgmem]. Decisions and documenrs of ehe Courr cieed herein are available online ae irs websiee, hnp:llwww.
sc-sl.org, unless otherwise noted.
2 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, SemencingJudgmene (Spec. Cc. Sierra Leone May 30,2012)
[hereinafcer SemencingJudgmem].
3 Searuee of the Special Courr for Sierra Leone, Arr. 1 (Jan. 16,2002) [hereinafcer Seaeure].
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leaders by supplying arms and ammunition in exchange for diamonds mined in Sierra Leone
(paras. 42-46).
Taylor served as president of Liberia from August 2, 1997, to August 11,2003, when he
stepped down in the face of challenges from rebel groups and political pressure. Afterward, he
went into exile in Nigeria. Before resigning, Taylor had already been indicted by the Special
Court, but his indictment and warrant of arrest were made public only during his first trip outside Liberia in June 2003. The indictment was unsealed when he was participating in peace
talks with rebel leaders in Ghana. But Nigeria refused to follow Interpol's instruction to arrest
Taylor. Nearly three years later, on March 29, 2006, following a request by the president of
Liberia, Ellen J ohnson-Sirleaf, he was arrested by the Nigerian authorities and surrendered to
the Special Court. The accused was transferred into the Court's custody in Freetown and then,
because ofsecurity concerns about holding the trial in West Africa, to The Hague in June 2006
(paras. 8-10).4
In addition to contesting his personal responsibility for the atrocities committed in Sierra
Leone, Taylor challenged the Special Court's jurisdiction on several grounds. Because he had
been head of state of Liberia at the time the indictment and arrest warrant were issued, he initially claimed immunity from any exercise of the Court's jurisdiction and sought to have the
proceedings terminated. Both the Trial and Appeals Chambers rejected that request on the
ground that the customaty international law doctrine of head-of-state immunity does not
apply to prevent an individual from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal. s Moreover, according to the Appeals Chamber, Article 6(2) of the Special Court's Statute,
which provides that those in an official capacity shall not be exempt from responsibility, does
not conflict with any peremptory norm of international law. 6
The Chamber also rejected Taylor's claims that the prosecution was selective and vindictive
(paras. 73-84). In this regard, the Chamber referred to the Celebici test of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) providing that, to demonstrate whether
a prosecution is selective, the defense must establish: "(i) an unlawful or improper (including
discriminatory) motive for the prosecution and (ii) that other similarly situated persons were
not prosecuted" (para. 79).7 The Chamber rejected the argument that statements by Prosecutor David M. Crane to the U.S. Congress and leaked U.S. Embassy cables constituted clear
evidence of the existence of political and improper motives behind the prosecution (para. 81).
Similarly, the Chamber rejected the defense's submissions that Taylor's trial was based on
discriminatory or improper motives because the prosecution had alleged that he, Col.

4 Security Council Resolution 1688 (June 16,2006) was issued pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations
Chaner. Imponandy, the Security Council noted the intention of the president of the Special Coun to establish
a chamber in the Netherlands for Taylor's trial and requested that all states cooperate in assisting the Coun in making arrangements for the proceedings.
5 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, [Appeals) Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, paras.
52-53 (May 31, 2004), at http://www.sc-sl.orglLinkClick.aspx?61eticket= 70eBn4RulEg= &tabid = 191.
6 Id., paras. 43-53. Anicle 6(2) of the Statute provides, "The official position of any accused persons, whether
as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such a person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment."
7 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 611 (Feb. 20, 2001).
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Muammar el-Qaddafi, and Blaise Compaore were members of the same joint criminal enterprise, but the latter two were not prosecuted by the Special Court. The defense cited the prosecutor's assertion that the destruction ofSierra Leone was" [s] ustained by a joint criminal enterprise backed by three heads of state ... [those of] Libya, Liberia, and Burkina FasO."8 The
Chamber nonetheless found that these allegations did not establish that other persons who had
not been charged bore the same level of responsibility as the accused (para. 82).
On the merits, the defense denied that the former Liberian president himselfbore any criminal responsibility for the atrocities that had been committed by armed groups duting the conflict in Sierra Leone (paras. 16-17). The facts of those atrocities had already been established
by the Special Court in other proceedings. 9 The question was whether (or how) they could be
attributed to Taylor. The prosecutor charged him with crimes against humanity and war
crimes under different modes ofliability pursuant to both paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 6 of
the Court's Statute.
Indeed, according to the indictment, as Liberian president, Taylor had planned, instigated,
ordered, committed, or aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of the
crimes in question. The accused, as a leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
and later as president of Liberia, had acted in concert with members of RUF, the AFRC, the
AFRC/RUF junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, including members or ex-members of
the NPFL. Thus, the prosecutor argued that Taylor, as a member of a joint criminal enterprise
OCE), was a principal perpetrator of the crimes committed; Taylor had participated in a
common plan, common criminal putpose, or design "to forcibly control the population and
territoty of Sierra Leone and to pillage its resources, in particular diamonds, by the use of criminal means, specifically a campaign of terror encompassing the Indictment crimes with [members of the different warring factions] and officials in his government during his Presidency"
(para. 6888).10
The Chamber rejected the prosecutor's submissions in relation to both superior responsibility and participation in a joint criminal enterprise, by holding that the accused did not have
effective control over the AFRC/RUF and that he was not acting pursuant to a common plan
to terrorize the population of Sierra Leone (paras. 6986,6900). Taylor was found guilty, however, on the basis of two modes ofliability pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute: "aiding and
abetting" and "planning."
Regarding the first of these modes, the Chamber held Taylor guilty as a secondary perpetrator
under Article 6(1), for aiding and abetting the planning, preparation, and execution of war
crimes and crimes against humanity (para. 6953). Consistently with the ICTY jurisprudence,
the Chamber held that such a mode of liability requires that the accused provided "practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support which had a substantial effect upon the commission of the crimes (actus reus)" (para. 6904). Moreover, the subjective element (mens rea) of
8 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 11 (May 23,2011) (quoting
Coun's first prosecuror, David M. Crane, in Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T-1D29, Defence Motion Requesting
an Investigation into Contempt of Coun by the Office of the Prosecution and Its Investigators, Annex 0, at
30,439-40 (Sept. 24, 2010».
9 Prosecutorv. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A,AppealJudgment (Oct. 26, 2009); Prosecutor
v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04- I 4-A, Appeal Judgment (May28, 2008); Prosecutorv. Brima, Kamara,
and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeal Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008).
10 Citing Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Public Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras. 574-87 (Apr. 8, 201 1).
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aiding and abetting requires that the "accused knew that his acts or omissions would assist the
commission of the crime, or that he was aware of the substantial likelihood that his acts would
assist the commission of the crime" (id.).
The Chamber established that as president ofLiberia, Taylor had provided arms and ammunition, military personnel, operational support, moral support, and operational guidance to
RUF, theAFRC, theAFRC/RUF junta, and Liberian fighters for military operations during the
relevant time. For instance, the Chamber found that there was a continuous supply to Taylor
of diamonds mined from areas in Sierra Leone, often in exchange for arms and ammunition.
In the Chamber's view, Taylor's practical assistance, encouragement, and moral support "substantially contributed to" the commission of the crimes by the AFRClRUF during the course
of the military operations in Sierra Leone (para. 6946).
Regarding the second mode ofliability, the Chamber found Taylor criminally responsible
for planning the crimes committed by members of the AFRC/RUF and Liberian fighters during
the attacks on Kono and Makeni in December 1998, and in the invasion of, and retreat from
Freetown between December 1998 and February 1999 (para. 6971). In particular, it said, in
November 1998, Taylor and RUF leader Sam Bockarie conceived a plan to carry out an attack
that would have culminated in the invasion of Freetown (para. 6958). That plan, the Court
noted, had defined the various military targets and the modus operandi of the attack. Moreover, the military campaign to recapture Freetown by the AFRC/RUF fighters had been characterized by extreme violence and involved the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Indeed, during the invasion, over seven thousand people were killed on January 6,
1999, while countless others were raped, mutilated, and displaced from their homes. According to the Chamber, the plan "substantially contributed to" the AFRC/RUF's military operations leading to and involving the Freetown invasion, during which these groups committed
the war crimes and crimes against humanity (para. 6968).
In sum, the Chamber found sufficient evidence to establish Charles Taylor's liability for aiding and abetting the planning, preparation, and execution of war crimes and crimes against
humanity in Sierra Leone between November 30, 1996, and January 18, 2002, and of planning
the crimes committed by AFRC/RUF and Liberian fighters during the above-mentioned
attacks on Kono and Makeni, and the invasion of Freetown. As a consequence, the Chamber
imposed a combined sentence offiftyyears on Taylor for multiple convictions pursuant to Article 19 of the Court's Statute and Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

****
The Taylor judgment is notable for the extensive detail with which it describes the events
during the civil war in Sierra Leone, for its application of the concepts of planning and aiding
and abetting to the role played by Taylor in those events, and for the severity of its sentence.
At nearly twenty-five hundred pages, the length of the judgment would create a sense of
bewilderment even in the most enthusiastic reader. The Chamber dedicated innumerable
pages to a discussion of the pre-civil-war context and, in particular, the pre-indictment period,
focusing, for example, on Taylor's role between 1990 and 1996. Moreover, because some of
this discussion concerned actions that were not included in the indictment submitted by the
prosecutor, it was not directly relevant to the establishment of Taylor's individual criminal
responsibility in this proceeding. But this approach could be justified on the basis that, unlike
domestic criminal courts, international criminal tribunals serve in part to document and draw
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attention not only to the specific culpable conduct of the individual defendant but also to its
larger context. According to the Chamber, the evidence prior to the indictment period was considered "only for the purposes of clarifying the context, or establishing by inference the elements of criminal conduct" (para. 2193).
Still, it is legitimate to ask whether the assessment of evidence not strictly relevant to the
establishment of liability can jeopardize the right to a fair trial, especially with regard to the
expeditiousness of the proceedings. In the present case, for instance, the criminal proceedings
lasted well over nine years, during seven of which the accused was held under detention. That
question also triggers another concerning the main purpose of international criminal tribunals.
Is the historiographical reconstruction of the events in a country fraught with civil or international conflicts a function more appropriate to a truth and reconciliation commission than
a criminal tribunal? As one author has suggested, the role of the latter is properly limited to
assessing legally relevant matters, while "[a]n increasing number offacts that are important to
historical research remain unexamined, because they appear 'neutral'-and thus uninteresting-in the beam of partisan lights."!!
In any event, the salience of the Taylor judgment rests on a number of facts. Charles Taylor
is only the second head of state to have been indicted, tried, and convicted by an international
criminal tribunal (the first was Admiral Karl Donitz, who succeeded Hitler as head of state of
the Third Reich in April 1945 and was thereafter convicted by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg). The verdict clarifies Taylor's role in the civil war in Sierra Leone. Yet
the judgment-consistently with the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissiondescribes his involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict as very modest. In fact, the Special Court
substantially rejected the prosecutor's thesis that the accused was a principal perpetrator pursuant to Article 6( 1) and that the crimes suffered by the people of Sierra Leone would therefore
not have occurred but for Taylor's supervision and support for RUF and the AFRC (paras.

6890-900).
Unlike the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Special Court's Statute
in Article 6(1) adopts a "unitarian" concept of perpetration, which does not provide for different forms of participation in the commission of a crime. In this regard, to distinguish
between principal and accessorial liability, the Taylor judgment discussed the concept of the
lCE (paras. 457-68). According to this theory, an individual who did not perform the actus
reus of the crime may still be held responsible for its commission on the basis of his participation
in a joint criminal enterprise. The prosecution must prove the existence of a common plan,
design, or purpose (which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in
the Statute) and the significant contribution to the crime by the accused. With respect to the
subjective element, the Chamber concluded that a principal may be liable as a co-perpetrator
even when the crimes committed by other members of the criminal enterprise exceed the
scope of the common plan, if they constitute a natural and foreseeable consequence of the common plan.!2
II Mirjan R. Damaska, What Is the Point ofInternational Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 329, 337
(2008).
12 An exception to such a type ofJCE applies in the case of special intent crimes like terrorism where, as noted
by the Chamber, it would be an anomaly to convict an individual as a co-perpetrator "for a dolus specialis crime
without possessing the requisite dolus specialis." Judgment, para. 468 n.ll 01 (quoting Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Case
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The Chamber found insufficient evidence to establish Taylor's responsibility as a principal
for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It held that the prosecution
had failed to prove Taylor's participation in any common plan involving the commission of
crimes falling within the Special Court's jurisdiction during either the pre-indictment period
(between 1991 and 1996) or the indictment period (between 1996 and 2002).
During the former, Taylor had provided RUF with a training camp in Liberia, instructors,
recruits, and material support, including food and other supplies, bur the Chamber did not
view the evidence as establishing that he had participated in any common plan involving the
commission of crimes with RUF leader Sankoh or the Gambian revolutionary known as
Dr. Manneh. The cooperation between the NPFL, under Taylor's command, and RUF did
not present any critical element of criminality bur, instead, was a military action and limited
in purpose (para. 6897). While Taylor supported the invasion of Sierra Leone in March 1991,
the prosecutor had not proved that the invasion was commenced pursuant to a common purpose to terrorize the civilian population (para. 6896). After his election as president of Liberia
in 1997, Taylor supplied RUF leaders with arms and ammunition in exchange for diamonds
throughout the indictment period, but the prosecution had also not proved that the armed
groups in question were actually supported pursuant to a common plan to terrorize the civilian
population of Sierra Leone (para. 6898).
Similarly, the Chamber refused to hold the accused criminally responsible under Article
6(3), which defines superior responsibility, since Taylor did not have effective control over
RUF or the AFRC/RUF junta (paras. 6977-86). Despite his substantial influence over rebel
leaders, the Chamber concluded that he was not in a position to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent or punish members of the armed groups who were responsible for the perpetration of the acts in question. As for the Liberian fighters who had participated in the commission of crimes in Sierra Leone, the Chamber found insufficient evidence to establish that
they remained under his authority or effective control once in Sierra Leone.
Apparently, the imposition of a lengthy sentence of imprisonment was significantly influenced by the official position of Taylor as head of state, rather than his involvement in the
commission of the crimes. He was convicted only as an accomplice under Article 6(1), and
was not shown to be a primary perpetrator of, hence responsible for, the crimes committed during the relevant time in Sierra Leone. In the sentencing judgment, the Chamber stated that,
"[a]lthough Mr. Taylor has been convicted of planning as well as aiding and abetting, his
conviction for planning is limited in scope.»13 In line with the Special Court's jurisprudence,
as well as that of the I CTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Chamber
admitted in principle that secondary liability, like aiding and abetting, warrants a lesser sentence than those imposed on principal perpetrators. 14
Nevertheless, it recognized an exception to this principle when the aider and abettor is a head
of state, since such a special status places the accused in a different category of offenders for the
purpose of sentencing. 15 According to the Chamber, the betrayal of public trust, which characterizes crimes committed by individuals who are charged with the duty to protect or defend
No. STL-1I-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law, para. 248 (Spec. Trib. Leb. Feb. 16, 2011)
(Cassese, J.».
13 Sentencing Judgment, para. 10 1.
14 Id., para. 36.
15 Id., para. 100.
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the victims, "outweighs the distinctions that might otherwise pertain to the modes ofliability
discussed above."16 Indeed, the Chamber explicitly stated that holding a leadership position
by an accused found criminally responsible for a crime under Article 6(1) of the Statute could
be considered an aggravating circumstance. I?
To underscore the significance of the leadership role in the sentencing context, it is worth
noting that the direct perpetrators of the crimes in questioQ, RUF leaders Issa Sesay, Morris
Kallon, and Augustine Gbao were convicted and sentenced to fifty-two, forty, and rwenty-five
years, respectively. 18 Trial Chamber I found thatthey had participated in a joint criminal enterprise that consisted of a common plan, shared by leaders of the AFRC and RUF, to "take any
action necessary to gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra
Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas."19
In assessing the gravity of the crime-the core element in the determination of the sentence-the principle of culpability should playa central role, especially in the case of intern ational crimes, which are generally perpetrated by a multiplicity of actors. That is, sentencing
decisions should reflect the specific responsibility of individual defendants for their own contribution to the crime in question. Such a decision should take into account, for instance, that
an aider and abettor need not share the exact criminal intent of the perpetrator; it suffices for
him to have knowledge that the perpetrators intend to commit the crime. Judges should refrain
from excessive reliance on those elements that do not fall within the culpability principle.
In this regard, it seems problematic that an international tribunal should give more weight
to the official status of the accused as head of state than to his actual contribution to the commission of the crime. The risk, of course, is that an accused individual may end up being sentenced on the basis of his official position rather than his actual conduct. The notable arbitrariness of judges in determining sentences sheds light, more generally, on the importance of
the principle oflegality (nulla poena sine lege), whose role has not yet been secured as a cornerstone of a fair and stable international criminal justice system.
TRIESTINO MARINIELLO

Edge Hill University, United Kingdom
16

I?

Id., para. 102.
Id., para. 29.

18

Prosecutorv. Sesay, KaHan, and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, SentencingJudgment, pt. VI (Apr. 8, 2009).

19

Id., Judgment, para. 1985 (Mar. 2, 2009).

